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PROTECTIVE ORDERS AND EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL FROM ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
JOEL R. JUNKER*
INTRODUCTION
With the increase of litigation and regulation as a major factor in do-
ing business in the United States, more business entities are employing their
own corporate counsel. The presence of corporate counsel provides a com-
pany quick access to legal opinions without expensive retainers, a continu-
ing review of company activities to monitor or prevent legal problems, and a
litigator in residence readily knowledgeable about company positions and
interests in the event a law suit arises.
The advantages of corporate counsel, however, have sometimes been
neutralized in those cases where corporate counsel participation was most
needed. Litigation concerning a company's most significant interests, such
as intellectual property rights or business activity affected by antitrust and
international trade laws, may involve protective orders that exclude corpo-
rate counsel from access to certain types of confidential information and
testimony. In the course of discovery, corporate counsel is thus precluded
from viewing information of a business confidential nature. During trial,
testimony relating to business confidential information may be taken in
camera with corporate counsel excluded from the courtroom. Corporate
counsel, as a result of the protective order's terms, have a severely limited
basis for participating in review, preparation and presentation of a case,
and advising corporate clients and the outside counsel conducting the
litigation.
There is a particular rationale used by courts and agencies for placing
restrictions on corporate counsel which is intended to justify this marked
deviation from the usual course of discovery. The reason, however, is not
necessarily compelling in all cases and should not be allowed to limit need-
lessly corporate counsel's participation in litigation important to their cli-
ents. Recent federal circuit case law in the context of international trade
regulation has affirmed such an approach by rejecting a doctrinal applica-
tion of the rationale for excluding corporate counsel, in favor of a case-by-
case analysis.'
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This article will discuss generally the rationale underlying restrictions
on corporate counsel and then will examine more specifically the compo-
nents of the protective orders which contain those restrictions. Next, the
article will suggest a range of various steps which might be taken to prevent
unnecessary limitations on participation of corporate counsel under protec-
tive orders.
I. RATIONALE USED FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RESTRICTIONS
ON CORPORATE COUNSEL
The system of litigation in United States courts and agencies contem-
plates the fullest possible disclosure of evidence within limitations of privi-
lege, relevance, practicality and fairness. Thus, a protective order restriction
on corporate counsel exists as an exception to the general rule of full and
open discovery and trial. To justify this limitation, a court or agency usu-
ally will rely on parts or all of the following rationale.
The foremost reason offered for excluding corporate counsel from ac-
cess to business confidential information under a protective order is that
parties are afraid their most sensitive data will be used unfairly by or will
fall into the hands of competitors. If such disclosure were to occur, a com-
pany very easily could suffer commercial injury or competitive disadvan-
tage. A company might well win the battle by obtaining a favorable verdict
but lose the war by failing to achieve a meaningful remedy, or even by
being driven out of business.2
For all but the most cynical, however, there may not appear to be com-
pelling reasons for excluding corporate counsel from access to business con-
fidential information. Corporation counsel, after all, attend the same law
schools, pass the same bar exams and have similar amounts of experience
and expertise as outside counsel. More importantly, corporate counsel, be-
ing officers of the court, have the same ethical obligations as outside coun-
sel, and in all likelihood are highly respected and honorable members of the
profession. Despite all this, restrictive protective orders effectively disen-
franchise corporate counsel from practicing their profession in important
cases.
The reasons behind a protective order limiting the use of corporate
counsel, however, are not intended as a comment on the individual integrity
2. See, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Perhaps the
most pointed example of litigation in which the risk of disclosure is of paramount concern to
party is a trade secret theft case. "Unique to trade secret cases is the danger that the very
information plaintiff seeks to protect will be exposed at some point in the case." Browne, Pro-
tecting Trade Secrets in Litigation, in PROTECTING AND PROFITING FROM TRADE SECRETS 88
(1979).
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or the conscious abilities of counsel. A court or agency may consider the
protective order as a cornerstone for the discovery of relevant evidence of a
confidential nature and the development of an adequate record. While fun-
damentally important, the protective order is, in a sense, a fragile thing
itself requiring protection; for even a doubt as to its efficacy, let alone an
outright violation of its terms, could impede seriously the conduct and con-
clusion of a trial. Consequently, a judge may weigh very heavily any re-
quest to include corporate counsel under a protective order or any other
activity which may cast a shadow across the protective order's perceived
capacity to protect disclosure of confidential information.
More specifically, there are three primary reasons given most fre-
quently for exclusion of corporate counsel from information under a protec-
tive order, despite their ethical obligations, good character and willingness
to be bound by its terms. The first stems simply from the inherent fallibility
of the human memory.3 With the passage of time, it is at best extremely
difficult and inevitably impossible to remember whether certain information
was classified as confidential, and further to segregate in one's mind and
separate the use of confidential from non-confidential material in circum-
stances not related to the litigation for which the information was exclu-
sively produced. 4 Consequently, it is reasoned that regardless of the best
efforts of corporate counsel, their having had access to an opponent's confi-
dential information could not help but influence their decisions, opinions
and advice in their normal daily activity.5
An example of this difficulty in a patent context would be the fairly
common situation in which an in-house patent attorney preparing or prose-
cuting a patent application frequently suggests to an inventor that he per-
form certain tests to acquire more data in support of patentability. Corpo-
rate counsel who has had access to a competitor's technology would be
required to perform an impossible mental task in order to determine what
3. "[lIt is very difficult for the human mind to compartmentalize and selectively suppress
information once learned, no matter how well-intentioned the effort may be to do so." FTC v.
Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d at 1350.
4. "This preference [for nondisclosure to house counsel] is not based on any reservation
as to the integrity of in-house counsel but is intended to avoid placing them under the unnatu-
ral and unremitting strain of having to exercise constant self-censorship in their normal work-
ing relations." Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 133 (1980).
5. "The Court does not in any way doubt the faithfulness of house counsel in endeavoring
to abide by the terms of any protective order. The issue concerns not good faith but risk of
inadvertent disclosure. House counsel are employed full-time to advance the interests of their
employer. They regularly meet with personnel of the corporation on day-to-day matters, whol-
ly apart from this litigation." FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d at 1350, (citing SCM v. Xerox
Corp., No. 15,807 (D. Conn. May 25, 1977) (Pre-trial Ruling No. 44) (A.996-1000), aff'd sub
nom. In re Xerox Corp., 573 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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tests he would have suggested to an inventor had he not earlier been ex-
posed to a competitor's confidential technology. Similarly, if corporate
counsel who previously had access in trade secret litigation to details of a
competitor's economic data or trade secrets subsequently became an officer
of his corporate employer, he could have a direct conflict between his obli-
gation as an attorney to adhere to the terms of the protective order and his
fiduciary duty as a corporate officer to exercise his best judgment to further
the business interests of the corporation.
The second major reason used for excluding corporate counsel by a
protective order accentuates these dilemmas: it is virtually impossible to po-
lice a protective order once corporate counsel have been given access to
confidential information. If corporate counsel were improperly or inadver-
tently to divulge confidential information or make use of such information
for purposes unrelated to the litigation, it is often a remote likelihood that
other parties or the judge would ever be aware of the breach of the protec-
tive order. Moreover, no order of any tribunal can police the segregation of
thoughts in the mind of a party's employee. Consequently, the most effec-
tive protective order is considered to be one which is self-policing through
the segregation of documents with outside counsel and experts.
A third reason given for protective order exclusions of corporate coun-
sel is that effective sanctions for breach of the protective order may be ei-
ther undesirable or unavailable. The ultimate sanction for a court would be
contempt and disbarment or disciplinary proceedings. This prospect would
be the least pleasant to any lawyer and may make the sanction the most
effective. However, a judge may not assign it much value since it can be
invoked only in the most egregious of circumstances, and even then with
dubious effect on future compliance with court orders or preservation of the
rights of private parties. This ultimate sanction is unavailable in many gov-
ernmental agency proceedings where contempt citations are not within the
powers of an administrative law judge.7 A form of disbarment is arguably
available to an agency which provides in its rules for barring an attorney
from practicing before it,8 but this sanction also may tend to be imposed
6. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); FTC v. United States Pipe & Foundry
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D.D.C. 1969).
7. See 5 U.S.C. §556(c) (1982).
8. Examples of agency regulations providing for bars to practice include: U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 19 C.F.R. §201.15(a) (1984); Dept. of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R.
§1.26(b)(2) (1984); Business and Credit Assistance, 13 C.F.R. §§101.8-7, 110.4 (1984); Civil
Aeronautics Board, 14 C.F.R. §300.20 (1984); Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17
C.F.R. §§14.1-.10 (1984); Consumer Product Safety Commission, 16 C.F.R. §1025.66 (1984);
Drug Enforcement Administration, Dept. of Justice, 21 C.F.R. §1316.51(b) (1984); Federal
Communications Commission, 47 C.F.R. §1.24 (1983); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., §12
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only in extreme cases.
Of lesser direct severity to the attorney but of significance to the client
would be sanctions within the context of the issues being litigated. A judge
could draw adverse inferences, exclude evidence of claims and defenses, or
even render final adverse findings of fact relating to the information which
was the subject of a breach of the protective order.9 The imposition of costs
or attorneys' fees, ordinarily a potent sanction, is in all likelihood an inade-
quate method of compensation in the circumstances of a protective order
breach. Expenses may not be used as a measure of damages which most
likely would be incalculable.1 0
The short response to the general rationale for exclusion of corporate
counsel is that these objections could apply equally to outside counsel.
Nonetheless, many courts and agencies weigh against this argument the
competing concern that the risk of disclosure is simply higher in the case of
corporate counsel. In some cases this risk differential will be viewed in the
court's discretion as large enough to justify drawing a line between two
otherwise identical groups of attorneys.1"
According to the Federal Circuit, however, distinguishing between
these two groups on the issue of access is unacceptable as a matter of law.
In deciding who shall have access to the confidential information, the court
must find that each set of facts satisfies the judicial tests involved. An indi-
C.F.R. §308.04(b) (1984); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 C.F.R. §lb.17 (1984)
and §385.2102 (1984); Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 12 C.F.R. §509.3(b) (1984); Federal
Maritime Commission, 46 C.F.R. §502.30 (1983); Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission, 29 C.F.R. §2700.80 (b)-(e) (1983); Federal Reserve, 12 C.F.R. §263.3(b)
(1984); Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. §4.1(e)(2) (1984); Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, 24 C.F.R. §2.13 (1984); Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8 C.F.R. §292.3
(1984); Dept. of Interior, 43 C.F.R. §1.6 (1983); Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R.
§§10.50-.75 (1983); Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 C.F.R. §1103.5 (1983); Dept. of
Labor, 20 C.F.R. §501.11(c) (1984); Maritime Administration, 46 C.F.R. §102.24 (1983);
National Labor Relations Board, 29 C.F.R'. §102.44(b) (1983); National Defense, 32 C.F.R.
§833.2 (1984); Office of Interstate Lands Sales Registration (HUD), 24 C.F.R. §1720.135
(1984); Patent and Trademark Office, 37 C.F.R. §1.348 (1984); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (1984); Small Business Administration, 13 C.F.R.
§§103.13-14 (1984); Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. §404.1745 (1984); Dept. of
Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 31 C.F.R. §§8.51-.52 (1984); U.S. Pos-
tal Service, 39 C.F.R. §§951.6-.7 (1983).
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); the sanctions set forth in Rule 37 are invoked by virtue of a
protective order's application to discovery through Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment, Subdivision (b).
10. Sanctions are discussed further in Sections II C, infra text accompanying notes 51 &
52 and III C, infra text accompanying notes 151-68.
11. Factors to be balanced against the need to keep information from corporate counsel
are discussed in Section I!I A, infra text accompanying notes 59-146.
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vidual case circumstance analysis was expressly adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the recent case U.S.
Steel Corporation v. the United States and U.S. International Trade Com-
mission.1 2 The court held that disclosure to corporate counsel may not be
restricted to avoid inadvertent disclosure if the opportunity for inadvertent
disclosure is determined solely by classification of counsel as in-house rather
than retained.' s Instead, risks of inadvertent disclosure of confidential infor-
mation are to be determined "by the facts on a counsel-by-counsel basis." '14
The case was an interlocutory appeal from a ruling by Judge Watson
of the U.S. Court of International Trade denying corporate counsel for U.S.
Steel access to confidential information.'5 That confidential information was
in the record in the appeal of a preliminary injury determination by the
United States International Trade Commission ("USITC") in investiga-
tions of domestic industry injury from certain imported steel products."
The confidential information at issue was contained in responses by foreign
parties to questionnaires propounded by the USITC in its injury investiga-
tions. 7 During the administrative proceedings before the USITC, corporate
counsel access to the confidential information was not permitted pursuant to
USITC rules which provide for a per se exclusion of corporate counsel.'"
The Court of International Trade restricted access to confidential informa-
tion during the appeal of the administration determination pursuant to its
discretionary powers over the handling of confidential information expressly
provided by statute.'"
U.S. Steel was in a particularly good position factually to contest the
issue of exclusion on the basis of corporate counsel status. Corporate coun-
sel at United States Steel were described as being functionally and physi-
12. No. 84-639 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 1984).
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 275 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), in-
corporating by reference, Docket No. 82-10-01361, slip op. No. 83-76, United States Steel
Corp. v. United States (Ct. Int'l Trade, July 22, 1983) and Docket No. 82-3-00372, slip op.
No. 83-95 (Ct. int'l Trade, Sept. 23, 1983), 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 57, 60.
16. Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-86
through 701-TA-144, 701-TA-146, 701-TA-147 (preliminary), Inv. Nos. 731-TA-53 through
731-TA-86 (preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1221 (1982), Certain Steel Products from the
Republic of Korea, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-170 through 701-TA-173 (preliminary), USITC Pub.
No. 1261 (1982) and Certain Steel Products from Spain, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-155 through 701-
TA-163 (preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1255 (1982).
17. See 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1671f, 1673-1673i (Supp. V 1981).
18. 19 C.F.R. §207.7(b) (1984).
19. 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
[Vol. 8
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
cally segregated from other departments of the corporation. The law de-
partment of U.S. Steel also had very strict procedures and policies for the
availability, handling and use of confidential information. Thus, the under-
lying facts involved virtually no possibility of inadvertent disclosure because
of the physical handling of confidential information or the physical proxim-
ity of corporate counsel to the business operations of the corporation; the
issue was narrowed to whether exclusion of corporate counsel could be
based on the status of counsel alone.
Judge Watson's decision to exclude corporate counsel from access to
confidential information based on their status was consistent with his previ-
ous rulings on the issue. A series of rulings had been based on the rationale
that corporate counsel, although of high integrity, should not be placed
"under the unnatural and unremitting strain of having to exercise constant
self-censorship in their normal working relations."'2 The relationship of
house counsel to employer as a closer and more sustained relationship was
presumed as an outgrowth both of the employer-employee relationship,"' as
well as of the employer's alternative of retaining outside counsel. 22 In terms
of the balancing test between the need for confidentiality and the need for
corporate counsel access, the court reached the following fundamental
balance:
The Court simply sees a greater likelihood of inadvertent disclosure by
lawyers who are employees, committed to remain in the environment of
a single company. The factor of permanent employment by one com-
pany is a rational means by which to distinguish between lawyers. It is
not a perfect distinction; but it is a reasonable one. It does not result in
an elimination of risk; but it does offer a significant increase in
protection.'
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in an opinion written by
Chief Judge Markey overturned Judge Watson's ruling and rationale ex-
cluding corporate counsel from access to confidential information on the
sole basis of their employment status.2 4 The Court focused on the relation-
ship between corporate counsel status and the risk of inadvertent disclosure.
The opinion suggests that concern for confidentiality may justify denial of
access to all attorneys, but if any access is to be granted, it should be given
20. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 133.
21. 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 57, 59-60.
22. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 275, 276.
23. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 57, 60.
24. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 84-639.
19841
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to both retained and corporate counsel when their working relationship, eth-
ical obligations, practice and problems of inadvertent disclosure are the
same. Further, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
case should be controlled by the specific power over the handling of confi-
dential information and appeals before the Court of International Trade or
by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure emphasis on discovery. 5 Finally,
the Court found it unnecessary to discuss arguments concerning whether
the Court of International Trade was creating a per se rule,26 whether there
had been a violation of right to counsel or disenfranchisement of counsel
without due process, and whether access should be granted because of the
"staleness" of the information at issue.27
The Court announced some tests which are to be used in a case-by-
case, more particularly, counsel-by-counsel, determination of corporate
counsel access to confidential information. The first test is an examination
of "each individual counsel's actual activity and relationship with the party
represented. '28 The Court approved the serviceable shorthand phrase "in-
volvement in 'competitive decision making' as a basis for denial of access."
The phrase is intended to cover examination of "a counsel's activities, asso-
ciation, and relationship with a client that are such as to involve counsel's
advice and participation in and all of the client's decisions (pricing, product
design, etc.) made in light of similar corresponding information about a
competitor.129
The second test is whether denial of access to information would force
a corporate party to suffer an extreme and unnecessary hardship by having
to rely on newly retained outside counsel. Under the test as it is applied in
this case, it is clear that where litigation is "extremely complex and at an
advanced stage" this test can be met."'
In sum, the Court's rejection of any denial of access to confidential
information based solely on an attorney's status as corporate counsel should
result generally in the opportunity for greater access to information for cor-
porate counsel. Although the effect may be realized in judicial proceedings,
the ruling does not mandate corporate counsel access to confidential infor-
mation in administrative proceedings. It is clearly still possible under a
case-by-case or counsel-by-counsel analysis that corporate counsel may be
25. Id. at 7-8.
26. The Court sidestepped this issue, stating its opinion "bears no relation to, and can
have no effect on, ITC's rule establishing a per se ban on disclosure to in-house counsel in its
administrative proceedings . Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id. at 6 n.3.
30. Id. at 7.
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denied access to confidential information because of a risk of disclosure in
particular circumstances presented to a court.
II. PROTECTIVE ORDER ELEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON CORPORATE COUNSEL
A protective order includes four substantive groupings of elements.
Within these different groups, certain elements of protective orders can be
applied to corporate counsel to restrict their access to confidential informa-
tion. 1 The major topics are: (1) provisions for defining and handling confi-
dential information; (2) provisions designating persons permitted access to
confidential information and conditions of access; (3) provisions on proce-
dure following unauthorized disclosure of confidential information; and (4)
miscellaneous provisions. According to the tenor of the order, the provisions
may range in specificity from rather liberal guidelines to more exacting
restrictions.
A. Definition and Handling of Business
Confidential Information.
Information is classified in protective orders as business confidential on
the basis of its type or character and on the basis of the effect resulting
from its disclosure.8 2
Confidential information consists of four basic types. The first category
is comprised of information relating to trade secrets,88 processes, operations,
styles of works, or apparatus. In other words, this information is the private,
sensitive "know-how" of a business. The second category reflects the day to
day activity of doing business: information about production, sales, ship-
ments, purchases, transfers, and identification of customers. The third cate-
gory includes inventories, or information on what items a company owns or
has on hand. The fourth category encompasses information of a financial
31. See the Appendix Protective Order infra which contains a collection of typical protec-
tive order general provisions. For the sake of reference and example, the Appendix Protective
order is a rather restrictive order with more provisions than might be found ordinarily in more
typical orders. As a result, the Appendix Protective Order is not drafted to be an internally
consistent document. Some provisions dealing with specific situations, e.g., a log of copies, have
been included by way of example and obviously do not cover all circumstances which a protec-
tive order may have to address.
32. Appendix, para. 1. The definition of confidential information can be more specific or
limited in scope, e.g., all interrogatory responses but no interrogatories themselves are to be
treated as confidential. The determination of whether given information is "confidential" is
discussed further in Section III A, see infra text accompanying notes 73-108.
33. Trade secrets are defined in 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757 (1939).
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nature, such as amounts or sources of income, profits, losses or
expenditures. "
Not only the type but also the effect of disclosure of information gives
it its confidential character. If public or unrestricted disclosure of any of the
types of confidential information would have the likely effect of impairing
the ability of a court or agency to obtain the information necessary for the
conduct of a full trial of the issues or the performance of statutory func-
tions, such information should be deemed confidential. 8 ' The concern re-
flected in this type of provision is for the forum and its capacity to conduct
fair adjudication based on full discovery. 6 The other concern regarding dis-
closure of sensitive information, of course, would be that of the party pro-
viding the information. Information should be classified as confidential if its
disclosure will cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the per-
son or entity from which information is obtained. 7
Once attained, the confidential status of information can be lost or
waived under provisions of a protective order. A protective order will pro-
tect the confidentiality of information only when the party providing such
34. Appendix, para. I.
35. In court, the disclosure of this information may occur in two ways. A party may seek
to introduce confidential information to discharge his own burden of proof. Or, the Court may
order parties to disclose confidential information because of its importance to a fair adjudica-
tion. An agency may be compelled to disclose information it has gathered from businesses
through questionnaires or inquiries, when it receives a request under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act [hereinafter cited as F.O.I.A.], 5 U.S.C. §§551-552b (Supp. V 1981).
36. Without a protective order covering the confidential information, a party might be
forced to choose continued confidentiality over the ability to present a successful case. Simi-
larly, court-compelled disclosure without a protective order could have the long term effect of
discouraging suits between competitors. In either case, if a needed order is absent, the court
ceases to provide a forum for complete adjudication.
37. Information which is deemed confidential in the court setting, however, may not nec-
essarily be deemed confidential by an agency in a later setting focusing on agency obligations
to release information under the F.O.I.A. In the latter context, the issue is whether the infor-
mation falls under exemption four of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-559
(Supp. V 1981), releasing the agency from its otherwise absolute obligation to disclose. See,
infra note 55. The determination of confidentiality there turns on whether disclosure would
frustrate the two fold policy behind exemptions from F.O.I.A. obligations, The first prong of
that policy is to encourage cooperation by those who are not obliged to provide information to
the government. These parties are more likely to provide information essential to agency func-
tions when they are persuaded the information is adequately protected from public scrutiny.
See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The second prong of the policy underlying the F.O.I.A. exemptions is to protect against
competitive disadvantage to any parties who have been legally obligated to surrender private
information. Thus, the exemption serves the goal of "(I) encouraging cooperation by those
who are not obliged to provide information to the government and (2) protecting the rights of
those who must." Id. at 769.
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information intends for it to be confidential and acts accordingly. Otherwise
the court or agency would restrict discovery unnecessarily and would limit
unduly the public nature of its trial or proceeding. Therefore, a protective
order should not apply or should rescind restrictions placed on the treat-
ment of information where the parties so agree,3 and will not apply where
supplied information is known publicly through no fault of a receiving party
either at the time the information was supplied or subsequent to its having
been provided."
Protective orders may anticipate disagreement on the status of certain
information and provide procedures for resolution of such disputes. Typi-
cally, objection to the confidential status of information is to be expressed in
writing to the party claiming confidentiality. A period of time is allowed
thereafter in which the parties must attempt to resolve the dispute them-
selves. If during that time the claim of confidential status is withdrawn by a
party, it is to notify all parties. In the event the dispute is not resolved, the
issue may then be brought before the presiding judge for disposition."'
The physical handling of business confidential information may be
dealt with in varying degrees in protective orders depending upon the needs
of particular circumstances. Designation of information as business confi-
dential, such as stamping the face of a document, usually is required. "1 Seg-
regation of confidential information from non-confidential information is
obligatory in virtually all cases; in specific instances, the number of copies,
the location permitted for the retention and review of documents, the filing
of documents under seal,"' the handling of documents by court personnel or
reporters' 8 and the return of documents may be enumerated along with any
other conditions appropriate to the nature of the litigation and informa-
38. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 3. To avoid disputes and for procedural certainty, permis-
sion for use of confidential information outside protective order restrictions is usually required
to be in writing. See also Appendix, para. 7 for written withdrawal of confidential designation.
39. See, e.g., Appendix, para 6. Protective orders can also require that no party may treat
as public any information previously designated confidential unless there is a notice motion and
a court order.
The language of Appendix, para. 6 allows use of confidential information made public
through no fault of the receiving party. This provision does not anticipate whether confidential
information made public through one party's breach of the protective order may be used as
non-confidential information by another party which was not responsible for release of the
information. On the one hand, the supplier party should not be prejudiced in a suit by im-
proper release of confidential information. On the other hand, there may be no reason to re-
strict information which is publicly available.
40. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 7.
41. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 2.
42. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 9.
43. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 13.
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tion." Provisions also may recite the fundamental practice of disclosing
confidential information at a hearing only in camera." Special handling for
service of briefs and memoranda containing business confidential informa-
tion can be provided. It is helpful to trial and corporate counsel to require
expurgated, non-confidential versions of such pleadings to be served as well;
these documents can then be passed on more quickly and more conveniently
to corporate counsel after a brief review by trial counsel.
B. Designation of Persons Allowed Access to Business Confidential
Information and Conditions of Access
The cardinal terms of a protective order are its provisions for limiting
disclosure of business confidential information to appropriate persons under
two primary conditions. The first, to prevent unauthorized disclosure, is that
no confidential information will be revealed to anyone not properly under
the terms of the protective order. The second restriction, to prevent unau-
thorized use, prohibits persons with access to confidential information from
using it for any purpose other than preparation and conduct of the subject
litigation.46
When a protective order is written to exclude corporate counsel from
access to confidential information, its general provisions usually will permit
access to trial counsel and their clerical staff, independent technical experts,
reporters and transcribers who take testimony, and court or agency person-
nel. Access of counsel either will be limited to "outside counsel," to the
preclusion of attorneys in the direct employ of a party, or corporate counsel
will be expressly excluded. To the extent corporate counsel may be qualified
as technical experts, such as patent counsel for example, they still could be
44. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 18. Documents also may be placed in the control of a custo-
dian who is to insure limited disclosure. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 891-92 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 883 (1978).
45. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 2; FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267 F. Supp. 713, 714-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
46. The protective order by its terms can be extended to include appeals or remands
resulting from the litigation in which confidential information is made available and the pro-
tective order is issued.
Use of confidential information "solely for the purpose of this litigation" has been con-
strued strictly to exclude disclosure of discovery material to the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice which was interested as a non-party to the suit in possible antitrust mis-
conduct. The court refused to allow disclosure even though the great majority of the
documents were declassified. GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); see Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) (both
deny later access to federal government); cf. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594
(7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d
1295 (1980).
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excluded by terms of the protective order which limit acceptable experts to
those not only outside the direct employ of a party, but also to those who
have no business affiliation with the party, or any affiliate or controlled en-
tity, other than for the purposes of the litigation concerned. More conserva-
tive protective orders will preclude, in addition, those experts who are em-
ployed by any company or person in the complete chain of commerce
respecting a product which is the subject of a suit.4
It is possible for persons who do not fall under these general rubrics to
be given access to all or limited types of confidential information through
stipulation of the parties. Certain protective orders make provision for this
procedure to occur independently; however, others require that any such
stipulation must receive the court's approval.48
Often a formal document must be filed by persons seeking access under
the protective order which states their consent to be bound by its terms.49
Under certain provisions, however, the mere filing of a consent to be bound
by itself will not entitle an independent expert to have access to confidential
information.6" A procedure can be set out by which a party wishing to give
confidential information to an expert must submit to the party supplying
the information the name and curriculum vitae of the proposed expert. If
the supplying party objects to disclosures to the proposed expert under the
protective order, such objection must be communicated in writing, and the
parties must attempt to resolve informally the matter. When no informal
resolution is reached, the objecting party is to place its objections before the
court within a period of time for disposition by the presiding judge.
C. Procedure Following Unauthorized Use or Disclosure of Business
Confidential Information
Under usual procedure for unauthorized use of disclosure or informa-
tion, the responsible party, in short, must make a full disclosure of its error
and attempt to mitigate any damage.51 The judge and the party supplying
the information are to be informed of all facts pertaining to the breach of
the protective order. Furthermore, the responsible party must do all within
its power to prevent further disclosure either by itself or by those to whom
information was disclosed improperly. No attempts to right the wrong, how-
ever, will absolve the offending party of responsibility for the breach, and
47. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 3. Such conservatism may arise, for example, in trade se-
cret cases or cases with a high degree of complexity.
48. See. e.g., Appendix, para. 5.
49. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 4.
50. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 16.
51. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 17.
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the supplying party ordinarily retains under the protective order all rights
to appropriate sanctions or remedies."'
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
Any number of secondary matters or contingencies can be covered by
the terms of a protective order. For example, protective orders issued in
proceedings before federal governmental agencies can have provisions cov-
ering requests for confidential information under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (F.O.I.A.)." Business confidential information is exempted from
F.O.I.A. requests," so protective orders may confirm that information made
confidential under its terms is also confidential for purposes of F.O.I.A.
requests.55
52. Sanctions are discussed in Section III C, see infra text accompanying notes 151-68.
53. 5 U.S.C. §§551-552b (Supp V. 1981). See, e.g., Appendix, paras. 14-15.
54. The F.O.I.A. request provision of the Administrative Procedure Act states in perti-
nent part:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are...
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential;...
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ...
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) and (7) (Supp. V 1981).
Exemptions (8) and (9) may be invoked in more particular circumstances to protect confi-
dential information:
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; or
(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(8) and (9) (Supp. V 1981).
See also Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979), in
which a company's profit rate, actual loss data and cost data were held exempt from F.O.I.A.
disclosure because its release was likely to cause substantial harm to the company's competi-
tive position.
55. This designation of confidential information is recited in part for purposes of criminal
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Supp. V 1981). While agencies may classify information
obtained in litigation or through industry-wide investigation as confidential under exemption
four of F.O.I.A. they are not required to do so. F.O.1.A. defines the information which agen-
cies must disclose, and its exemptions define the information they need not disclose. It does not
bar disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Thus an agency may decide to
disclose "confidential" information if it is in the public interest to do so. Similarly, an agency
may disclose it because it does not agree that it is confidential. In the latter case the supplying
party has resort only to a "reverse-F.O.I.A.-action" in which he seeks judicial review of this
agency decision. For a discussion of the circumstances sustaining this cause of action, see
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Agency protective orders can be responsive to parties' fears that per-
sons not under the protective order will be able to obtain information
through a F.O.I.A. request before parties are able adequately to protect
their documents. In order to preserve confidentiality, the order should re-
quire the agency, at an express minimum and without limitation, to notify a
party of F.O.I.A. requests for, or proposals for declassification of, its confi-
dential documents. Moreover, a period of time, usually at least seven days,
is provided during which a party is allowed to take appropriate action to
preserve confidentiality and protect access to confidential documents.5
For purposes of verification of trial evidence, the parties may wish to
provide for access to original documents."7 To complete instructions on the
handling of business confidential information, a protective order may set
forth the steps for return of confidential documents upon the conclusion of
litigation. Such detail may go as far as setting a time period for return of
items, allowing for the destruction of confidential documents on which an
attorney's work product notes appear, and requiring a written receipt which
acknowledges return of confidential materials.
58
III. APPROACHES TO UTILIZING CORPORATE COUNSEL EXCLUDED BY
PROTECTIVE ORDER
In the event a protective order that finally issues denies corporate
counsel access to confidential information, corporate or outside counsel can
nevertheless take certain steps to maximize their exposure to such informa-
tion. Additionally, counsel can address issues bearing on the general acces-
sibility of information.
Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business
Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REV. 587 (1977);
Note; Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Pro-
tection, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 995 (1976); Note, Protection From Government Disclosure - The
Reverse-F.O.I.A. Suit, 1976 DUKE L.J. 330, and cases cited therein.
On the other hand, an agency refusal to disclose on the basis of exemption four, leads the
party seeking disclosure to judicial review. The agency is put in the position of defending the
supplier's need for protection from competitive injury. See, e.g., National Parks, 498 F.2d 765.
In short, having obtaining a protective order in earlier litigation may not always protect an
information supplier from later agency disclosure.
56. A partial list of such regulations includes: Environmental Protection Agency, 40
C.F.R. pts. 2.201-309 (1983); Food and Drug Administration, 21 C.F.R. pts. 20.48-.53; Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, 10 C.F.R. pt. 2.790; Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs,. 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-60.8. The ultimate ramifications of fulfilling F.O.I.A. requests,
both as to the status of information initially designated confidential and as to the issue of
corporate counsel access are beyond the scope of this article.
57. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 10.
58. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 18.
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A. Motion for Modification of the Protective Order
The most direct and obvious means of obtaining a protective order that
allows corporate counsel access to confidential information is to move the
court for such an order.6 9 It may be clear that the court for the reasons
already discussed is disinclined to give corporate counsel access to informa-
tion under an order.6 0 One should bear in mind, however, that a protective
order is issued in the discretion of the court,6 and that the disclosing party
has no absolute right to an order totally restricting information.6 2 Conse-
quently, there may be factors in a particular case which on balance out-
weigh those considerations supporting restricted disclosure to corporate
counsel. These factors may be used as grounds for a motion for appropriate
issuance or modification of a protective order.
1. The Balancing Test: Weighing Competitive Injury Against the Need
for Disclosure
The primary purpose of a protective order is to allow a party in litiga-
tion to disclose sensitive business information without suffering commercial
or competitive harm by having that information used unfairly or revealed to
the public or to current and potential competitors.6 Where no substantial
harm would occur from disclosure, there is insufficient reason to restrict
information through a protective order, particularly one that especially ex-
cludes corporate counsel; cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Accord-
ingly, courts have allowed disclosure of confidential information where the
result would not cause a degree of injury which outweighs the need for
disclosure.
59. A third party, not the original party seeking discovery, may move to modify as well.
Any motion to modify should usually be made to the judge in control of the case when the
order issued. Federal Court Discovery in the 80's - Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245,
286 (1983).
60. See infra, introduction and text accompanying notes 1-10.
61. E.I. Dupont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917); Fergu-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Lever Bros. Co.,
193 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal denied, 371 U.S. 207, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
932 (1962); Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1978); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Aluminum Can Corp. of Am. v. United States Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Div., 444 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1978).
62. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 10 F.R.D. 458, 460 (D.C. Del. 1950);
Louis Weinberg Assoc. v. Monte Christi Corp., 15 F.R.D. 493, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Ameri-
can Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 684 (D.R.I. 1959).
63. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Laboratories v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379, 383 (S.D. Ohio
1981).
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a. Proof of competitive injury. In applying this balancing test,64 the
court in United States v. Aluminum Company of America" found the po-
tential prejudice or harm from disclosure to be "more theoretical than prac-
tical." 66 The court's choice of this "practical harm" test is significant, for
the party seeking to maintain complete confidentiality under this test may
not meet its burden by suggesting the mere possibility of injury. Instead, a
greater showing of the inevitability or likelihood of demonstrable injury is
suggested by the "practical harm" requirement.
Other courts approach the degree of harm from disclosure more gener-
ally by inquiring whether disclosure would cause the supplying party "great
competitive disadvantage and irreparable harm" or an "undue burden."67
Although these tests appear to be of a more general nature, they must re-
quire some degree of specific "practical harm" to be consistent with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). A protective order under Rule 26(c) is is-
sued only upon a showing of "good cause"' 8 which has been interpreted as
requiring the moving party to make a "particular and specific demonstra-
tion of fact." 9
Judge Wilkey in his dissenting opinion in the In re Halkin0 case
before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
perceptively points out that different showings of "good cause" should be
required for the different types of harm threatened by disclosure:
64. This test was particularly well articulated in Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,
340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965) and In re Halkin, 598
F.2d 176, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Judge Wilkey dissenting). See also Connors Steel Co. v.
United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112, C.R.D. 80-9 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (1981); Roquette Frefes v. United States, No. 82-111 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Dec. 13, 1982).
65. 193 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
66. Id. at 250. This phrase was cited expressly and favorably by the court in United
States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. at 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
67. Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 87 F.R.D. 43, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Doe v. District of Co-
lumbia, 697 F.2d i115, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 97 F.R.D.
494, 501 n.24 (N.D. III. 1980), and cases cited therein.
68. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
69. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2035 (1st ed.,
1970).
"The degree of specificity with which this information [about a party's interest] must be
brought to the court's attention varies from case to case. For example, the kind of showing
necessary to constitute "good cause" depends in each case upon the kind of protective order
sought." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Judge Wilkey dissenting).
70. 598 F.2d 176, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Some kinds of harm are capable of clear objective demonstration. For
example, a moving party can easily demonstrate with particularity that
certain materials are "trade secrets" or that a particular oral deposition
would entail great inconvenience. However, other kinds of harm are
more subtle and less amenable to objective demonstration. Annoyance,
embarrassment, and harassment are proper grounds for protective or-
ders but are relatively difficult to demonstrate with particularity. This
does not mean that these more subtle injuries pose any less of a threat
to the moving party. Indeed, it may mean that more subtle abuses of
discovery are occurring, and this is all the more reason for trial judges
to be sensitive to these kinds of dangers.7 1
Thus, he concludes:
In sum, then, the relative specificity of a particular showing under Rule
26(c) is not determinative of the showing's adequacy. The inquiry is
whether the court has before it information from which it can reasona-
bly conclude that the nature and magnitude of the moving party's in-
terest are such that protective intervention by the court is justified. 71
In other words, a demonstration of specificity of harm is not the only factor
to constitute a showing of "good cause"; other qualitative factors should be
considered. These other factors, which Judge Wilkey calls the "nature and
magnitude. of a moving party's interest," are not explicated further; how-
ever, the most likely analysis implied by this language would be a showing
of the commercial or competitive value of the interests potentially affected
by disclosure, and a causal link between the disclosure of specific informa-
tion and the anticipated harm that would result.
b. Causation. A second qualitative factor affecting the "good cause"
determination is the showing of a causal link between the disclosure of spe-
cific information and the anticipated harm that would result.
A good example of a court focusing on the competitive value of inter-
ests and the link between disclosure and harm is the Fifth Circuit opinion
in U.S. v. United Fruit Co.7 The background of that opinion involved an
earlier antitrust action in which defendant United Fruit Co. agreed by way
of a consent judgment to create from its assets a new banana importing
71. Id. at 211.
72. Id. Compare the interest to be protected in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724
F.2d 1010 (1984).
73. 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nor. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v.
United States Fruit Co., 396 U.S. 820 (1969).
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company, Sovereign Fruit Co. As a part of the judgment and a later court
action, United Fruit Co. was required to submit detailed plans showing
timely compliance. These plans, which included information on assets, pro-
grams, costs and markets, were placed under a protective order prohibiting
third party access to them. A third party, Standard Fruit and Steamship
Co., moved the court for permission to inspect and copy the submitted
plans. The district court denied the motion, and an appeal was taken to the
Fifth Circuit. 7
The circuit court held inter alia that the district court had not abused
its discretion in denying the third party access to the confidential docu-
ments. Standard Fruit and Steamship argued that it would be placed at an
unfair disadvantage if United Fruit were to be privy to the details of the
Sovereign Fruit Co. operations while Standard Fruit and Steamship were
not. If anyone should have access to the information, Standard Fruit and
Steamship contended, it should be smaller competitors like itself rather
than the dominant, "guilty" United Fruit. These arguments were rejected
by the court which recognized that the ultimate goal of the earlier consent
judgment was the establishment of an eventually independent competitor,
and that there was a far smaller chance of Sovereign's competitive survival
if all competitors, and not just United Fruit, were to have access to the
submitted confidential information." In its analysis, the court's emphasis
upon the competitive value of the information was cardinal to its determi-
nation that disclosure in this instance was not justified. 7 "
The court also took pains to specify in some detail the examples of
harm which could result directly from disclosure. From the affidavit of Sov-
ereign's president, the following instances of potential harm were
enumerated:
[I]f competitors were aware of areas in which Sovereign planned to
press its sales most vigorously, they could adjust and alter sales plans to
frustrate and defeat Sovereign's sales success; if competitors had infor-
mation as to Sovereign's proposed price aims, they could adjust pricing
policies to undercut Sovereign's prices and harm its sales; if competitors
had information as to promotional plans contemplated by Sovereign,
they could copy the best features of those plans in advance or offset
them by running promotions of their own in the same areas; if competi-
74. id. at 554-55.
75. Id. at 556-57.
76. Another good example of this causation rationale can be found in Borden Co. v. Sylk
v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 289 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1968), appeal dismissed, 410 F.2d 843
(3d Cir. 1969).
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tors had information as to the anticipated volume of Sovereign's im-
ports to particular ports or marketing areas, they could adjust imports
to those ports and marketing areas so as to defeat Sovereign's selling
efforts; if competitors had even approximate knowledge as to Sover-
eign's costs, they would be able to know the price levels below which
Sovereign could not go without risking financial failure; if competitors
had knowledge of Sovereign's plans for changes in the volume of pro-
duction, they could adjust production plans to counteract Sovereign's
changes, etc."
The causal link between disclosure and harm can be questioned if the
harm anticipated by the supplying party can be shown to be a normal "by-
product of competition. 17 8 In Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,7 9 the
Tenth Circuit permitted certain trade secrets to be produced for discovery
in an antitrust case on the rationale that, "[iln any competitive economy we
cannot avoid injury to some . . . competitors."80 It should be noted that the
court in that case ordered production of confidential information in great
part because the protective order had extensive limitations on the use of the
information, including disclosure to outside counsel and independent ac-
countants only. However, if it can be shown that alleged harm from disclos-
ure would occur in any event as a by-product of normal and fair competi-
tive or economic conditions, then disclosure to corporate or retained
counsel, would not be the primary causal factor to injury, and such disclos-
ure arguably should be permitted.
Contentions of irreparable injury from disclosure can be discounted by
a showing that the confidential information at issue is legitimately obtaina-
ble from other sources. The district court so ruled in Essex Wire Corp. v.
Eastern Electric Sales Co.81 when it found that the name and country of
origin of foreign cable was to be conspicuously marked by law82 for the
benefit of consumers. This approach, which emphasizes the absence of in-
jury from disclosure of such information, is also a variation of the more
common argument that information has lost its confidential status because
of its public availability.83
77. United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d at 557 n.l 1.
78. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965). See supra
text accompanying note 64.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 999 n.20, (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1422, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, as quoted in
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1962)).
81. 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
82. 19 U.S.C. §1304 (1976).
83. See United States v. Aluminum Can Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D.N.Y.
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Whether injury follows from disclosure is a question which often arises
in cases where there is a request by a party to take confidential information
supplied by an opposing party in one forum and disclose that information in
concurrent litigation in another forum. Such disclosure would violate a pro-
tective order's requirement that confidential information be disclosed only
for purposes of the instant litigation. Very often this problem is resolved by
stipulation of counsel to treat the confidential information in the concurrent
litigation in the same manner as the primary litigation, or to seek jointly an
identical protective order in the concurrent litigation. 84 However, if no such
agreement can be reached and disclosure is contested, the issue becomes
whether disclosure in concurrent litigation, even under restrictions from a
protective order in that litigation, would constitute irreparable harm to the
supplying party in its litigation as distinct from causing harm in the sup-
plier's commercial context.
The court in Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp.8" addressed this issue
in a preliminary review and rejection of a protective order proposed by a
defendant which limited plaintiff's use of confidential information to the
instant investigation. In its ruling, the court held that as a federal court it
would not limit full use of the information in other fora as long as three
conditions were met.81 First, there must be no showing that the instant case
has been instituted and exploited in bad faith solely to assist in other litiga-
tion before a foreign forum. Second, the litigation in the foreign forum
must be of a closely related nature involving what essentially are the same
parties. Third, there must be voluntary consent among the attorneys to
maintain the secrecy of the information from non-party competitors 87 and
the general public.88
c. Types and sources of information which make competitive injury
from disclosure unlikely. Certain types of categories of confidential infor-
mation can be characterized as not among those traditionally entitled to
protection from corporate counsel review. In United States v. Lever Broth-
1960).
84. If an agency has obtained confidential information as a party to primary litigation,
for example, it might stipulate to treat it as such in concurrent F.O.I.A. litigation.
85. 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
86. Id. at 410; see also United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.
1969); Meyer v. MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 85 F.R.D. 149, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
87. The court in Johnson Foils, however, allowed disclosure to technical advisors of plain-
tiff who were also plaintiff's employees. 61 F.R.D. at 409, 410.
88. See also Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D. Pa.
1969). The appeal of allowing use of discovered information in other fora is that it produces
savings by avoiding duplicative discovery. When the movant is the government, seeking prior
civil discovery for use in criminal cases, the burden of proof as to need may well be higher.
Federal Court Discovery in the 80's, 95 F.R.D. 245, 286-87, supra note 59.
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ers Co.89 the court allowed corporate counsel access to confidential informa-
tion by noting inter alia that certain categories of confidential information
traditionally are entitled to "greater protection." 90 Those categories recog-
nized as normally deserving greater protection have included trade secrets
and secret processes," customer lists,92 net income,9 3 gross sales,"4 prices
and profits relative for forecasts," production costs,9" terms of supplier con-
tracts, 97 license fees and oral agreements with customers. 98 These types are
comprised of information having strategic competitive significance or sub-
stantial commercial value and therefore are given protection most often by
way of a protective order.9"
Information not entitled to greater protection, therefore, can be
demonstrated by showing the absence of commercial or competitive signifi-
cance. 10 0 Such a showing has been used successfully with respect to dated
89. 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal denied, 371 U.S. 207 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 932 (1962).
90. 193 F. Supp. at 257.
91. See Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1975); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981).
92. American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 684 (D.R.1.
1959).
93. United States v. National Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
94. Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 823 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
95. FTC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1256, 1261 (D.D.C.
1969).
96. Id.
97. Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969). But
note, the court permitted disclosure of the manufacturer's name so long as the terms of the
supply contract were protected. Id. at 311.
98. Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99. Regardless of the type of information, however, its disclosure can be justified where
no injury would result. See Section III A (1), supra text accompanying notes 63-88. In the
international trade context, the competitive significance of such information has the added
element of transnational economic competition. Judge Nichols' dissent in United States Steel
v. USITC illustrates the political-economic sensitivity of this issue in international trade:
[Tlhe intervenors, original sources of the information in question, are willing for the
court to allow disclosure to retained but not to in-house counsel. What they think is
important because, if they consider the litigation is conducted in a manner unfair to them
and in effect a nontariff barrier to their trade, they could withdraw their marbles from
our game and invite their own government to take retaliatory action against United
States trade.
No. 84-629, slip op. (dissent at 1-2).
100. But see American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680
(D.R.I. 1959), in which the court overruled objections to interrogatories requesting the names
of alleged lost customers. The court held that "[slince these customers are already lost to the
defendant it cannot be urged that the defendant has any interest in their identity such as
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information or information no longer current.' Similarly, if information is
not broken down into utilizable distinctions such as brand names or product
lines, there is a better chance of showing the lesser value of such informa-
tion to a competitor and the smaller likelihood of improper use.
102
The commercial or competitive value of information and likely injury
from its disclosure can be determined not only by the type of information,
but also by the source of the information. When the party supplying the
information is not a direct competitor of the party to whom disclosure will
be made, there may be inadequate grounds for an order regulating or
preventing such disclosure. This position was used successfully in Louis
Weinberg Associates v. Monte Christi Corp.,0 3 a breach of contract action
in which plaintiff alleged negligence by defendant in the processing of
braid. To establish the quality of its processing and the processing of others
in the industry, defendant sought the names of plaintiff's purchasers and
other braid processors. The defendant's request was granted with the court
noting more than once that the parties were not competitors.'" The impor-
tance of this consideration is reflected in the fact that it was significant
enough to support disclosure of customer names, a category of information
traditionally entitled to greater protection.O" Although the court addressed
the issue in the context of a motion to compel discovery, considerations of
the sources of information should apply by analogy to motions for modifica-
tion of protective orders to include corporate counsel.
Disclosure of confidential information may possibly be permitted when
the source of the information is a third party and not a party to the litiga-
tion. As a general principle in litigation, the inconvenience to third parties
caused by disclosure of information is "outweighed by the public interest in
seeking the truth in every litigated case, with both sides better prepared,
and the element of unfair surprise completely eliminated."' ' Nevertheless,
inconvenience to the third $$cparty may not be the only consideration when
disclosure of confidential information is sought; certain governmental
would require protection from disclosure"; yet, the court did not allow this disclosure to be
made to anyone other than outside counsel. Id. at 684.
101. United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. at 257; Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
102. United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. at 257.
103. 15 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
104. Id. at 495. The court also found significance in the fact that there was no other
method for the defendant to discover the facts at issue.
105. See American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, and
supra text accompanying note 92.
106. United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. at 257. See also In re Coord. Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Legislation 101 F.R.D. 34 (1984).
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agency investigations are possible only through information from non-par-
ties,1 0 7 and some courts still may apply full blown analysis to the type of
information, the potential harm, and other factors."0 8
2. Disclosure Necessary for Case Preparation and Presentation. Within the
specific context of a case, nondisclosure of confidential information to cor-
porate counsel might compromise severely the preparation of the case. This
impediment may arise when corporate counsel's access to and evaluation of
the confidential information is essential, either because corporate counsel is
the sole trial counsel, or because corporate counsel is an irreplaceable ex-
pert aid to outside counsel's presentation. This situation, depending upon
the severity of the circumstances, can be compelling cause for the court to
permit disclosure. In analyzing such circumstances, the test for the propri-
ety of disclosure is still one of balancing the harm from disclosure with the
public interest in full and fair litigation of issues. The emphasis shifts, how-
ever, in arguing that the harm to the supplying party in disclosing informa-
tion is outweighed both by the harm from nondisclosure to the requesting
party, and by the benefit to the litigation as a whole.
The most persuasive argument for disclosure in such circumstances is
that the requested confidential information is not only relevant but also
"absolutely necessary to the preparation" of the issues in the case, and "to
deprive knowledgeable [party] personnel of the absolute right to examine
and discuss these documents at the trial would be tantamount to depriving
[the party] of the right to defend [or prove its case]." ' °9 In such circum-
stances, a protective order can only prevent disclosure to corporate counsel
"except insofar as it may be necessary for consultation with [outside] coun-
sel . . . in order to prepare for and assist in the . action."" 0
Disclosure to corporate counsel may be similarly justified in the prepa-
ration of a case when confidential information produced in discovery is of
"a nature which inherently requires discussion with expert personnel and
107. For example, domestic industry injury determinations by the U.S. International
Trade Commission in dumping and countervailing duty investigations are dependent in great
part upon third party information supplied in confidential responses to agency questionnaires.
Tariff Act of 1930, §§701-707, §§731-740, codified as 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1671f, §§1673-1673i
(Supp. V 1981)); 19 C.F.R. §§207.7-.8 (1982); see also Garfinkel, Disclosure of Confidential
Documents Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: A Corporate Nightmare?, 13 LAw &
POLY INT'L Bus. 465, 469 (1981). For the rationale protecting third-party rights, see supra
notes 37 and 55.
108. United States v. American Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 586 (N.D. Cal. 1966); see
also, Mead Digital Sys. v. A.B. Dick Co., 89 F.R.D. 318, 321 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Hawaii
Corp., 88 F.R.D. 518, 525 (D. Haw. 1980).
109. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 256, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
appeal denied, 371 U.S. 207 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 932 (1962).
110. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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those intimately familiar with the industry, to be meaningful."'' Further-
more, to obtain all necessary consultation in case preparation, the number
of personnel should not be limited so as to "unnecessarily hamper the pro-
gress of [the] litigation, and be unfair to legitimate use of the informa-
tion.""' 2 When confidential information includes names of customers or per-
sons who should be joined as parties to a case, this information too may be
disclosed."'
The most cogent circumstance offered to justify disclosure to corporate
counsel involved in trial preparation would be where corporate counsel
alone represent the corporation without the appearance of outside coun-
sel. "4 As compelling as this circumstance might be, it may not justify dis-
closure without an additional showing that confidential information will re-
ceive adequate physical protection, e.g., a law department in separate
facilities, locked file cabinets, sign-out logs, confidential wrappers and the
like. Furthermore, a court may well require a showing that the "trial" cor-
porate counsel do not function as "commercial" counsel in such a manner
as to raise the extraordinary risk of unfair use of confidential informa-
tion. "' If courts require a strict showing of the independent function of
"trial" corporate counsel, only those corporate law departments large
enough to have completely separate litigation departments may be in a posi-
tion to raise this argument.
The federal district court in Southern Ohio ruled in Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay"6 that corporate counsel would be allowed ac-
111. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. at 257. See also NLRB v. Friedman,
352 F.2d 545, 548 (3d Cir. 1965).
112. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
114. This circumstance was before the U.S. Court of International Trade in United
States Steel Corp. v. United States (Consol. Court No. 82-3-00288) where a motion for access
to confidential information was filed on August 5, 1982, by United States Steel. United States
Steel was represented in the litigation solely by corporate counsel from its Law Department, a
section of the corporation distinct and physically separate from its other operations. Because of
a settlement of the case, the court did not rule on the motion. United State Steel Corp. v.
United States, No. 83-76 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 22, 1983).
115. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission,
No. 84-639, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 1984). Despite this showing, it can be argued in
opposition that an attorney's position is not static, and a "non-commercial" in-house attorney
may be transferred or promoted to different activities beyond purely litigation responsibility.
See FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47, 57 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The close proximity
and relations likely between legal and non-legal employees, or litigation and commercial corpo-
rate counsel in normal working contexts also diminish the differences in risk suggested by the
different categories of corporate counsel.
116. 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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cess to confidential information because of his role as trial counsel. In Bax-
ter, defendants based their defense on claims that plaintiffs had attempted
and were continuing to monopolize or restrain trade. Part of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct was the subject law suit brought by plaintiffs. De-
fendants moved for a protective order preventing disclosure to Mr. Lewis,
an in-house attorney for plaintiffs, on the ground that counsel's limited use
of information for the allegedly illegal lawsuit was indistinguishable from
improper use for other corporate purposes. The court was not persuaded by
that argument and ruled that disclosure could be made under protective
order to the attorney. 11 7
Much like Judge Markey in United States Steel v. U.S. and USITC,
the court declined to analyze the issue of disclosure as involving a square
conflict between the right to counsel of choice and the potential for injuri-
ous abuse of confidential information. Neither was the court concerned with
"the person involved, or with formal designation for that person's various
roles." For this court,
[t]he essential concern is with different kinds of conduct (i.e., proper
use of confidential information for Plaintiffs' litigation versus improper
use for Plaintiffs' regular business purposes). A conflict occurs only if a
person performs roles requiring, respectively, each kind of conduct and,
further, only if that person cannot be expected to differentiate his con-
duct in performing each role. In other words, the precise question in
this case is whether Lewis can be expected to sue confidential matters
obtained in his role as "trial counsel" only in the prosecution of this
litigation, and not use such information for the corporations' "other"
purposes in his role as "in-house counsel."'1a8
The court concluded that there was no "insurmountable difficulty" in cor-
porate counsel differentiating between proper and improper uses of confi-
dential information and that there was "no reason to question the reasona-
ble expectation" that corporate counsel would conduct himself
appropriately under the protective order. °9
Despite this the court's ruling in Baxter, the opinion suffers some
shortcomings as authority for disclosure to corporate counsel. First, the
court did not engage in a balancing jest. In permitting disclosure to corpo-
rate counsel, the court, unlike most courts, expressed no consideration con-
cerning any significant risks or competing interests which might outweigh
117. Id. at 419-21.
118. Id. at 419-20 (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 420.
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the need for disclosure. Second, the court did not determine which specific
types of confidential information might have been disclosed."" Third, the
Baxter court allowed disclosure, not because the need for it outweighed its
potential abuse, but because the court remained unpersuaded by defen-
dants' objection, that the improper corporate use of the confidential infor-
mation was the anticompetitive act of bringing the suit itself. This argu-
ment would prevent disclosure to outside and inside counsel alike.' If
counsel in a case objects to disclosure to corporate counsel only after stipu-
lating to disclosure to outside counsel, the facts of that case are arguably
distinguishable from Baxter.
In certain agency adjudications under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 122 the use of corporate counsel in the preparation and presenta-
tion of a case may be encouraged through the right to choice of counsel
granted by the APA. Section 6(a) of the APA12 3 provides:
Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or repre-
sentative thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, repre-
sented, and advised by counsel. 12.
This section has been construed broadly as granting a right to counsel of
one's choice:
It is clear that the right to counsel guaranteed under the Administra-
tion Procedure Act is much broader than the right to have an attorney
to advise him relative to his rights under the Fifth Amendment. The
Act says such counsel may accompany, represent and advise the wit-
ness, without any limitation ...
120. Although the Court does overrule Defendants' motion in part, it declines to issue an
Order, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(c), 2, 37 (i.e., an Order compelling disclosure of "re-
stricted-confidential" information to Lewis). No controversy over disclosure of a specific
item of "restricted-confidential" information has been presented herein, and, in view of
the fact that the parties are in the process of negotiating for stipulation, a broader protec-
tive order . . . this Court does not wish to compromise those efforts . ...
Id. at 421 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 420.
122. 5 U.S.C. §§551-559 (Supp V 1981).
123. 5 U.S.C. §555(b) (1976).
124. Id. The term "persons" includes both parties and witnesses. United States v. Smith,
87 F. Supp. 293 (D.C. Conn. 1949).
The right to counsel at various proceedings, i.e., a statutory right, has been distinguished
from the right to be represented by counsel, i.e., a right inherent in Due Process. See Rex
Investigative & Patrol Agency v. Collura, 329 F. Supp. 696, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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We recognize that what is in issue here is not the constitutional right to
counsel. It is, however, a statutory right. The term "right to counsel"
has always been construed to mean counsel of one's choice. . . . We
think this is the plain and necessary meaning of this provision of the
law. 1
2 5
Despite this expansive interpretation of the right to choice of counsel,
it has been subjected to significant limitations. The APA provision by its
own terms "relates only to persons whose appearance is compelled or com-
manded, and does not extend to persons who appear voluntarily or in re-
sponse to mere request by an agency." 2 6
The APA right to counsel, inasmuch as it is not absolute, may be cir-
cumscribed also by what can best be termed "reasonable limitations." Such
limitations can reflect ethical or public interest considerations such as those
in issues of disqualification of counsel.127 The express and inherent powers
of the presiding authority to control a proceeding in a fair and orderly fash-
ion '12 8 may justify limits on the right to counsel as well. Several right to
counsel cases have evolved from agency rules that prevent counsel from rep-
resenting and being present at the testimony of more than one witness to
the agency proceeding. 2 9
Although the use of corporate counsel under the APA right to counsel
of one's choice may be circumscribed by an agency, the spirit of Section
6(a) suggests that it should not be done because of the employment status
of counsel alone; there should be a showing, beyond mere argument, of the
actual possibility and likelihood of injury before depriving a witness or
party from exercising the right to choose counsel.1 3
Certain ultimate trial rights may indicate the propriety of pretrial dis-
closure to corporate counsel. For example, corporate counsel may possibly
be present for the disclosure of confidential information in the presentation
of evidence at trial by virtue of Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
125. Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1960).
126. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 61-62
(1947). See also Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.W.V. 1965); Smith v. United States,
250 F. Supp. 803 (D.C.N.J. 1966); see also United States v. Bachman, 267 F. Supp. 593, 595
n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
127. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5, DR 5-101; CANON 9;
Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 271 (D.C. Del. 1980); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978). See also FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1341-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
128. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1976); FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d at 1345.
129. Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d
550 (9th Cir. 1966); SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Steel, 238
F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
130. Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969).
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Rule 615 provides:
Exclusion of Witnesses
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may
make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclu-
sion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or em-
ployee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its repre-
sentative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a
party to be essential to the presentation of his cause."' 1
Exceptions (2) and (3) may be invoked to permit the presence of corporate
counsel during in camera sessions in a trial where corporate counsel may
give evidence as a witness. The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Pro-
posed Rules state that designation of the party representative under excep-
tion (2) may be made by the client or the attorney. 13  The third exception
can be read to include corporate counsel in light of the Advisory Commit-
tee's comment that:
The category contemplates such persons as an agent who handled the
transaction being litigated or an expert needed to advise counsel in the
management of the litigation. 33
The party seeking an exception to sequestration of witnesses has the
burden of showing why a Rule 615 exception is applicable. 34 In turn, the
court is required under Rule 615 to articulate fully the basis for the exer-
cise of its discretion.13 5 The court's discretion may be limited, however,
where corporate counsel are argued under the third exception to be neces-
sary to the presentation of a case. The Sixth Circuit in Morvant v. Con-
struction Aggregates Corp.,3 6 has held:
[W]here a party seeks to except an expert witness from exclusion under
Rule 615 on the basis that he needs to hear firsthand the testimony of
the witnesses, the decision whether to permit him to remain is within
the discretion of the trial judge and should not normally be disturbed
131. Fed. R. Evid. 615.
132. Fed. R. Evid. 615, Advisory Committee Note.
133. Id.
134. Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 1980).
135. Id.
136. 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1979).
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on appeal. . . .On the other hand, where a fair showing has been
made that the expert witness is in fact required for the management of
the case, and this is made clear to the trial court, we believe that the
trial court is bound to accept any reasonable, substantiated representa-
tion to this effect by counsel.1 3 7
Where a showing can be made that corporate counsel ultimately will
have a right of access to information at trial, there is an argument that the
information should be disclosed earlier in discovery so as to avoid delays
during trial. The court in Lever Bros. concluded that because corporate per-
sonnel would have the "absolute right to examine and discuss" confidential
information at trial, limiting access during discovery would merely "delay
the inevitable." The effect of this delay would be frustration of the purpose
of discovery in the form of substantial delays during trial for review of in-
formation at that time. 38" Even without an absolute right to view evidence
at trial, disclosure may be urged on the ground that restrictive limitations
in a protective order, such as the number of persons and experts allowed
access, "would unnecessarily hamper the progress of [the] litigation."' 9
However, some circumstances require that a decision on disclosure be made
only at trial upon consideration of established facts. ' "
3. Procedural Defects
Protection of confidential information can sometimes be challenged for
procedural deficiencies. For example, protection for information may be ob-
tained in some courts only by way of notice motion and not by an order to
show cause.1 4' Similarly, the failure to designate confidentiality of certain
documents according to the terms provided by order or allowed by a court
may result in disclosure.1 4 2 A court's protective order limiting access to in-
formation sought through agency subpoena cannot be issued before an ac-
137. Id. at 630.
138. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. at 258. The Lever Bros. case, how-
ever, did not involve Rule 615.
139. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
140. International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
but see Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Va.
1972), in which the court, even without knowledge of the main issues of the case, ordered
discovery testimony to be given under protective order rather than leaving the issue to the
judge at trial.
141. United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
142. FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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tion for enforcement has commenced. 4 3
4. Public Policy Factors
An argument for disclosure to corporate counsel sometimes can be
strengthened by draping it with the mantle of public policy or of the public
interest. The most ubiquitous public policy in a litigation context is "the
public interest in seeking the truth in every litigated case, with both sides
better prepared, and the element of surprise completely eliminated.' 44 It is
likely that a court would be persuaded more readily to order disclosure
from a specific showing of need than from a general public policy argu-
ment. However, the court will be balancing all competing interests; if non-
disclosure "would not further such a clear public policy or the interests of
justice," 5 or is otherwise unsupported by public policy, the balance may
well fall in favor of disclosure to corporate counsel.
5. The Protective Order Context
Finally, in moving for disclosure to corporate counsel on any of the
grounds discussed above, one should recall and emphasize that any disclo-
sure the court may allow will be covered by the terms of a protective
order. 4 This fact is often neglected in the heat of argument on the merits
of the motion for disclosure. Any risks that may arise from corporate coun-
sel access are tempered by astute adherence to particular protections estab-
lished in the court's order and the limited use of information in the prepara-
tion and presentation of the case.
B. Explore Possibilities for Stipulation
When corporate counsel are excluded across the board from access to
confidential information under a protective order, there nevertheless may be
instances where a limited disclosure' would be acceptable by agreement of
143. Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
144. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. at 257. In trade secret/patent cases,
the interest in maintaining confidentiality can be overcome by "the public interest in seeking
the truth about who is entitled to [a] patent." Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969). See also National Polymer Prods. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1981).
145. Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). As an
example of public policy, the court discussed a privilege for personal records not relevant in
litigation so as to encourage full initial disclosure to the Internal Revenue Service.
146. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. at 258; United States v. American
Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 586 (N.D.Cal. 1966).
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the parties on an ad hoc basis. The circumstances of each case should be
examined closely for those areas of possible mutually agreeable exceptions
to a protective order. Likely areas for stipulated access to information can
include methods for designating limited or conditional confidentiality, and
physical conditions for restricted access to documents.
Depending upon the circumstances of a case, there may be latitude for
exceptions to the protective order concerning specific documents which, al-
though classified as confidential, would cause no objection if revealed to
corporate counsel for a purpose beneficial to the litigation as a whole. For
example, in-house patent counsel might be in a position to withdraw certain
causes of action in a complaint for infringement if he were given access to
blueprints or product development reports that in all likelihood would con-
firm his doubts about questionable allegations.
Counsel might consider also a more sophisticated system for classifica-
tion of documents than the simple "confidential" or "non-confidential" de-
signations. A designation of limited confidentiality could be placed on docu-
ments to allow restricted disclosure based on the nature and substance of
the information or on the identity of the party whose corporate counsel may
have access. Technical documents or blueprints in some cases might be ac-
ceptable for review by corporate counsel, and designated as "Confidential
Technical Information" as opposed to "Confidential Commercial Informa-
tion," for example.' 47 Similarly, documents and information of a party
might be sensitive with respect to certain parties but not to others, and
different tiers of confidentiality might be fashioned to reflect such relation-
ships. With any increase in the complexity of confidentiality designation,
however, comes an increased danger of inadvertent disclosure; consequently,
counsel should be cautious in weighing the advantages of a system of li-
mited confidentiality against corresponding risks.
Stipulations permitting disclosure of information to corporate counsel
may be feasible if specific restrictions are established respecting the place
and manner of corporate counsel's access. 4 8 Documents to be viewed by
corporate counsel can be restricted to the supplier's offices or those of trial
counsel. Other restrictions can include limits or prohibitions on copying or
the taking of notes. Again, the amalgam of circumstances determines what
restrictions are appropriate. 4
Another stipulated procedure is the use of non-confidential summaries
147. See, e.g., FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379, 382 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
148. See. e.g., V.D. Anderson Co. v. Helena Cotton Oil Co., 117 F. Supp. 932, 948-49
(E.D. Ark. 1953).
149. See, e.g., Marshwood Co. v. Jamie Mills, 10 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
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of confidential information. Such summaries can be drafted or approved by
the supplier of information and then provided to corporate counsel. In all
likelihood such summaries will not be of particular value except in very
limited situations. However, even with restrictions that leave corporate
counsel only a general impression instead of specific information, restricted
access to confidential documents through stipulation may result in corporate
counsel's being able to make some strategic contribution to decisions in
litigation.15 '
C. Detection of Improper Classification and Choice of Sanctions
If corporate counsel are restricted from access to confidential informa-
tion, trial counsel should review confidential discovery for improper classifi-
cation of documents which needlessly restricts information corporate coun-
sel might otherwise review. Parties supplying confidential information have
a somewhat predictable tendency to err on the side of caution when decid-
ing whether to designate information as confidential, and may classify in-
formation improperly without bad faith. Consequently, a continued moni-
toring of discovery documents will ensure the broadest legitimate exposure
of information to corporate counsel.1 '
There are three responses to correcting improper confidential classifica-
tion of information. Initially, improper classification might be remedied
most easily by a telephone call or letter. A telephone call has the advantage
of speed; however, a letter copied on the court not only will address the
specific problem but also indicate to the court that there may be potential
abuse of its protective order. If a telephone call or letter proves ineffective,
the third remedy would be through motion to the court for declassification
150. An example of where advantage might result from this practice is the situation in
which corporate counsel might authorize a settlement figure if he were given an indication of
the approximate dollar value of a transaction which is at issue.
151. Review of information classification is increasingly important when all parties may
not be present at document productions. Faced with an apparent matter of first impression,
one district court concluded:
[T]he [Protective] Order can apply to information obtained through discovery methods
by counsel for one party when counsel for the other party is not present. This Court could
find no case law authority for this proposition (and the parties have cited none), but it is
not foreclosed by the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), describing a variety of "discovery
methods." Once this proposition is accepted, it follows that the counsel of one party can-
not be expected to designate documents as confidential at the time of "production," when
counsel would not be present at the production. Counsel would be obliged, of course, to so
designate documents (if they wished) once they learned that a third party . . . had "pro-
duced" documents for counsel of the other party.
Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379, 383 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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of documents based on the applicable definition of "confidential informa-
tion." Such motions should be filed promptly upon finding improper classifi-
cation in order to place all information before corporate counsel as early as
possible as well as to inhibit any continued practice of improper designation
of documents and to foreclose any opposing arguments of untimeliness or
waiver.152
If there is repeated abuse158 of classification of information, any of
three motions may be used to address the problem. Where a large number
of documents is involved, one can file a motion for an order to show cause
why all of a party's documents should not be declassified in the absence of
justification for confidential classification of specific documents. This show
cause order forces a party to "come clean" on all its documents and meet
expressly and affirmatively its burden of showing the appropriateness of
confidential designations.'" Abuse of confidential designation might also
provide grounds for a motion to amend the protective order to include cor-
porate counsel.15 5 If the abuse is so pervasive as to preclude preparation of
a case or interfere with a right to adequate or effective counsel,'"6 the inclu-
sion of corporate counsel under the protective order might be a defensible
remedy to the abuse.'
The third motion and most extreme remedy concerning abuse of confi-
dential designation is a motion for sanctions. 5 In requesting sanctions,
counsel should consider the full spectrum of sanctions available and suggest
lesser as well as more drastic sanctions. Undoubtedly, one wants to obtain
as much advantage from the situation as possible, but a court is limited to
granting sanctions appropriate to the circumstances without overreach-
ing.1 59 If no such sanctions are requested, a court might well be disinclined
152. An argument of waiver prevailed in FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 210-11 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
Another method of resolving disputes concerning confidential designation is to submit the
information at issue to a special master for classification. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 10 F.R.D. 458, 460 (D. Del. 1950). See also Sisk, Discovery, Protec-
tive Techniques and Strategy in Trade Secret Litigation, in PROTECTING AND PROFITING
FROM TRADE SECRETS 62-63 (1979); Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
153. One example of abuse of confidential classification is unnecessary confidential classi-
fication of discovery requests themselves, e.g., interrogatories, to inhibit house counsel in the
preparation of responses.
154. See, e.g., Appendix, para. 7.
155. See generally discussion in Section III C, text accompanying notes 151-68 supra.
156. See discussion in Section III A(l)(d), supra text accompanying notes 108-40.
157. Issuing a protective order as a remedy for classification abuse might well be prefera-
ble to a judge as an alternative to applying sanctions.
158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
159. Rule 37 states that the court may issue orders only for sanctions "as are just." Id.
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or too unimaginative to fashion its own."' 0
Sanctions available for either abuse or breach of a protective order run
a broad range. Sanctions bearing directly on the cause of offending actions
include on the lesser end of the spectrum a showing that correction has
been rendered and an undertaking of assurances that no similar violation
will recur. A corrective order also can require the establishment and proof
of a system of checks within an office to prevent inadvertent disclosure or
classification of confidential information. More severe direct measures are
the disqualification of counsel responsible for abuse or breach of the protec-
tive order and personal responsibility for resulting costs, expenses and attor-
neys fees. 1 '
Indirect sanctions for abuse or breach of a protective order are the
more traditional sanctions such as those set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b)(2). The most drastic sanctions include dismissal of the ac-
tion, a judgment adverse to the offending party," 2 or a contempt citation. 6 3
160. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
161. An abuse of confidential designation could be argued in extreme circumstances to
constitute a violation of the obligation of counsel under Canon 7 to represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law.
EC 7-20 In order to function properly, our adjudicative process requires an informed,
impartial tribunal capable of administering justice promptly and efficiently according to
procedures that command public confidence and respect. Not only must there be compe-
tent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues, but a tribunal must be aided by rules
appropriate to an effective and dignified process. The procedures under which tribunals
operate in our adversary system have been prescribed largely by legislative enactments,
court rules and decisions, and administrative rules. Through the years certain concepts of
proper professional conduct have become rules of law applicable to the adversary adjudi-
cative process. Many of these concepts are the bases for standards of professional conduct
set forth in the Disciplinary Rules.
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client 'When he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. . . .(3) Conceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal. . . .(5) Know-
ingly make a false statement of law or fact. . . .(8) Knowingly engage in other
illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same. . . .(2) A
person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly
reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
Attorneys may be held personally responsible for excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred from unreasonable or vexatious multiplication of a proceeding under 28
U.S.C. §1927 (1982).
162. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) and (C).
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Such sanctions in the context of a protective order concerning confidential
information would be unlikely in the absence of flagrant and intentional
conduct;'" even then, such a sanction may provide little comfort where sen-
sitive commercial or trade secret information becomes public. If the abused
information relates to something less than the full merits of a case, dismis-
sal of a particular pertinent cause of action or pleading might be more of a
well tailored response. 16 5 Should dismissal of any or all parts of the action
be inappropriate, a stay of the proceedings may be more palatable to the
court, especially where there is a desire or possibility for an offending party
to reform its objectionable activity. 16 Evidentiary sanctions, particularly a
prohibition on the introduction of improperly classified information, may be
fitting. 6 7 Costs and attorney's fees resulting from a party's failure to obey
the protective order are authorized also under Rule 37(b)(2)."'
D. Equal Application of Protective Order Restrictions
As a matter of course, trial counsel should see that corporate counsel
of opposing parties are in fairness generally restricted to the same extent as
one's own corporate counsel. Attention should be given not only to the more
obvious question of the types of restrictions on confidential information;
counsel should examine also whether opponent's trial counsel might be
"employees of a party" within the definition of a protective order.
Trial counsel bound by the terms of a protective order are obligated to
use confidential information for no other purpose than the litigation for
which the information is produced. Yet, it is common for trial counsel to
advise or act for a party on matters affecting its business activity, but
outside the litigation in which a protective order is issued. Such advice
could be tantamount to business rather than legal advice.'69
If it can be demonstrated that particular trial counsel have extensive
contacts with a client party outside the scope of litigation, or in other
163. "[T]he second subsection [of Rule 37(b)] authorizes a variety of sanctions, including
contempt, which may be imposed by the court in which the action is pending." Fed. R. Civ. P.
37, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment.
164. Conduct sufficiently egregious to result in these sanctions most likely constitutes
grounds for disciplinary action as well.
165. Fed. R. Civ. P.37(b)(2)(C).
166. Id.
167. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) and (B).
168. Reasonable expenses and attorney's fees will not be awarded, however, where the
failure to obey a protective order is substantially justified or the award of expenses is otherwise
unjust in the circumstances of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
169. This possibility would be likely in antitrust or securities matters, for example, or
similarly in situations where outside counsel handle a company's patent applications.
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words, that trial counsel can be considered "alter egos" of the party rather
than "independent professionals and officers of the court,"1 " there may be
substantial grounds for exclusion of certain opposing trial counsel from ac-
cess to confidential information." 1 Alternatively, the lack of any distinction
between the functions of opposing outside trial counsel and corporate coun-
sel can be offered to justify disclosure to corporate counsel.
E. Preventive Monitoring of Legislation and Agency
Rulemaking
Corporate counsel who have clients with a continuing interest in a par-
ticular subject matter or who appear regularly before an agency can exer-
cise some preventive caution through review of pertinent legislation or
rulemaking. Proposed agency rules and legislation before Congress may
bear directly or indirectly upon the ability of corporate counsel to obtain
access to information, and their formative stages are often the best time to
protect corporate counsels' interests in both obtaining and protecting confi-
dential material.
An unusually direct example of an agency rule affecting corporate
counsel access to information is rule 207.7172 of the U.S. International
Trade Commission. In the early proposals for the International Trade Com-
mission's rules governing investigations of injury to the domestic industry in
dumping and countervailing duty cases, 17 ' Rule 207.7 allowed disclosure of
certain confidential information to "an attorney of a party to the investiga-
tion, excepting in-house counsel. 1 7 " The proposed rule received extensive
public comment, even from corporations which had never appeared previ-
ously before the Commission, from corporate law sections of several bar
associations, and from an ad hoc association of corporate counsel created to
address the proposed rule.175 These comments caused a reconsideration of
the proposed rule and an examination of several alternative draft rules.1 7
Ultimately Rule 207.7 was adopted in a form which excludes corporate
170. Connors Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112, C.R.D. 80-9 (1980); see also
Note, International Trade: Discovery of Confidential Information in Antidumping Cases, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 224, 226 (1981).
171. Such an argument, as with respect to corporate counsel, may be made without re-
gard to the personal integrity of counsel. It is based on a like general concern for a significant
risk of unconscious and unfair use of confidential information.
172. 19 C.F.R. §207.7 (1984).
173. Tariff Act of 1930, §§701-707, §§731-740 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1671f,
§§1673-1673i (Supp. V 1981)).
174. 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458, 76,461 (1979).
175. 45 Fed. Reg. 57,147 (1980).
176. 46 Fed. Reg. 28,673 (1981).
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counsel;177nevertheless, it is fair to say that any significant possibility of
defeating the rule existed particularly at the time of its proposal. Thereafter
it was extremely difficult to challenge successfully the Commission's author-
ity to adopt such a rule.17 8
Legislation can govern any number of important aspects in the classifi-
cation and handling of confidential information. The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act exemptions are often the subject of lobbying and congressional
attention. 79 Of particular breadth in its treatment of confidential informa-
tion is the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.180 The
Improvements Act prohibits the disclosure of information which was ob-
tained through compulsory process and which is within exemption 4 of the
F.O.I.A.' 8 ' Furthermore, the Improvements Act addresses mandatory confi-
dentiality, custodial treatment, confidential marking, return of confidential
materials, and permissible disclosure. 182 Regardless of a bill's purpose and
subject matter, attention should be paid to legislation having information
177. The version of Rule 207.7 finally adopted reads in pertinent part:
"[T]he Secretary shall make such confidential information available to an attorney of such an
interested party, excepting corporate counsel, under a protective order. 19 C.F.R.
§207.7(a) (1984).
Adoption of this form of the rule was based on the following rationale:
(Tihe Commission finds that there is no apparent viable alternative to the current rule. Even
though each of the alternatives considered has certain merits, on balance the present restric-
tion best encourages voluntary submission of information, discourages disputes over release of
information, and provides a bright-line, self-executing standard. Therefore, the Commission
has determined that the current restriction will be retained, except that the phrase "in-house
counsel" will be replaced by the phrase "corporate counsel."
47 Fed. Reg. 6,188 (1982).
178. As noted above the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in United States Steel
Corp. v. United States declined to address the validity of any ITC per se rule on disclosure to
corporate counsel. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Judicial review would be suc-
cessful only upon a more stringent showing of error. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)-(D) (1976). Fur-
thermore, a court may not impose its own set of protections unless the agency abuses its discre-
tion in determining what protection confidential information should receive under its own
protective order. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 903 (3d Cir. 1978).
179. Concern for inadvertent disclosure from F.O.I.A. responses surfaces in Congress pe-
riodically. The Federal Drug Administration, the only federal agency without a pre-release
notification policy, was the subject of Congressional scrutiny following repeated mistaken dis-
closure of confidential information. Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1983, at A 1l. The mistaken release of
an herbicide formula by the Environmental Protection Agency responding to a F.O.I.A. re-
quest was further cause for the chemical industry's efforts to have Congress limit F.O.I.A.
disclosure of commercial information. Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1982, at 1. See supra notes 55-56.
180. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified in sections of 15 U.S.C.) (herein-
after cited as Improvements Act.)
181. Improvements Act § 3(a) amending § 6(f) and adding § 21 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§46(f) and 57b-2 (1982).
182. 15 U.S.C. §57b-2 (1982).
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disclosure or reporting requirements which can involve confidential
information.183
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of who gets what information is an issue central to any
litigation. Protective orders are perhaps the single most important means of
achieving a pragmatic resolution of that issue where confidential informa-
tion is involved. A protective order simultaneously safeguards the interests
of competing parties and the general interest of the forum in maintaining
its ability to adjudicate fully and fairly. Thus, a protective order can serve
as a linchpin which holds together successful litigation.
Protective orders, however, adversely affect the choice of counsel of a
corporate party when they restrict corporate counsel's access to confidential
information. Corporate counsel, who by their unique position are of greatest
advantage to the client, ironically from that very circumstance are some-
times prevented by a protective order from meaningful participation in liti-
gation. Limited access for corporate counsel reflects a balance struck
against a party's individual interest in counsel of choice in favor of protec-
tion of an opposing party's confidential information, and also in favor of the
forum's general interest in encouraging full discovery without any percep-
tion of extraordinary risk of inadvertent disclosure or unfair use of confi-
dential information.
Even though denied access to information under a protective order,
corporate counsel may take steps to maintain their level of contribution to
litigation. Counsel should insist that the scope of the protective order be
limited only to information deserving the protection of confidentiality so
that corporate counsel access to discovery and evidence is maximized. Stip-
ulations should avoid where possible unnecessary protection of confidential
information. Furthermore, protective order restrictions should be applied
equally to all parties to prevent any unfair advantage.
Most importantly, a protective order should be challenged if circum-
stances on balance do not fully justify the order's restriction of corporate
counsel's participation. In the words of the Federal Circuit, "[Tlhe factual
circumstances surrounding each individual counsel's activities, association,
and relationship with a party, whether counsel be in-house or retained,
must govern any concern for inadvertent or accidental disclosure." 1 The
balance struck in the decision on whether to issue a protective order ought
183. See, e.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §4019 (1982).
184. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 84-639, slip op. at 5 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
23, 1984).
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to be a delicate one. Consequently, all relevant factors should be considered
in the context of each case before a party is to be denied its first counsel of
choice or before disclosure of confidential information is permitted to all
counsel. Perhaps, in the end, the proper analysis in litigation is the same as
in life: "The fact of't is, all men can be trusted, but not with the same
things."' 8 5
185. J. BARTH, THE SOT-WEED FACTOR 520 (1969).
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APPENDIX
PROTECTIVE ORDER*
WHEREAS, documents and information are sought, produced or ex-
hibited by and among the parties to the above captioned proceeding, which
materials relate to trade secrets or other confidential research, development
or commercial information,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Confidential business information is information which has not been
made public and which concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the production, sales, ship-
ments, purchases, transfers, identification of customers, inventories, amount
or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm,
partnership, corporation, or other organization, the disclosure of which in-
formation is likely to have the effect of either (1) impairing the Court's [or
Agency's] ability to obtain such information as is necessary for a complete
record, or (2) causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization from which the
information was obtained, [unless the Agency is required by law to disclose
such information].
2. Any information submitted, either voluntarily or pursuant to order,
which is asserted by a supplier to contain or constitute confidential business
information shall be so designated by such supplier in writing, or orally at a
deposition, conference or hearing, and shall be segregated from other infor-
mation being submitted. If any confidential business information is supplied
by a nonparty to this litigation such a nonparty shall be considered a "sup-
plier" within the meaning of that term as it is used in the context of this
order. Documents shall be clearly and prominently marked on their face
with the legend: "[supplier's name] CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS IN-
FORMATION, SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER," or a compara-
ble notice. Such information whether submitted in writing or in oral testi-
mony shall be disclosed at any hearing only in camera before the Court.
3. In the absence of written permission from the supplier or an order
* For the sake of reference and example, this Protective Order is a rather restrictive
order with more provisions than might be found ordinarily in more typical orders. As a result,
the Order is not drafted to be an internally consistent document.
19841
232 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
by the Court, any confidential documents or business information submitted
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 above shall not be dis-
closed to any person other than: (i) outside counsel for parties to this litiga-
tion, including necessary secretarial and clerical personnel assisting such
counsel, (ii) qualified persons taking testimony involving such documents or
information and necessary stenographic and clerical personnel thereof, (iii)
technical experts and their staff, who are employed for the purposes of this
litigation (unless they are otherwise employed by, consultants to, or other-
wise affiliated with a party, or are employees of any domestic or foreign
manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, or distributor of the subject matter of
this case), and (iv) the Court and its personnel [the Agency and its staff
and personnel of any governmental agency as authorized by the Agency].
4. Confidential business information submitted in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 2 above shall not be made available to any person
designated in paragraph 3(i) and (iii) unless he or she shall have first read
this order and shall have agreed, by the attached Nondisclosure Agreement
filed with the Court and served on all parties: (i) to be bound by the terms
thereof; (ii) not to reveal such confidential business information to anyone
other than another person designated in paragraph 3; and (iii) to utilize
such confidential business information solely for purposes of this litigation.
The term "litigation" shall be deemed to include any appeal or remand
resulting therefrom.
5. If the Court orders, or if the supplier and all parties to the investiga-
tion agree, that access to or dissemination of information submitted as con-
fidential business information shall be made to persons not included in par-
agraph 3 above, such matter shall only be accessible to, or disseminated to,
such persons based upon the conditions pertaining to, and obligations aris-
ing from this order, and such persons shall be considered subject to it, un-
less the Court finds that the information is not confidential business infor-
mation as defined in paragraph 1 hereof.
6. The restrictions upon, and obligations accruing to, persons who be-
come subject to this order shall not apply to any information submitted in
accordance with paragraph 2 above to which the person asserting the confi-
dential status thereof agrees in writing, or the Court rules upon proper mo-
tion, was publicly known at the time it was supplied to the receiving party
or has since become publicly known through no fault of the receiving party.
7. If a party to this order who is to be a recipient of any business
information designated as confidential and submitted in accordance with
paragraph 2, disagrees with respect to such a designation, in full or in part,
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it shall notify the supplier in writing, and they will thereupon confer as to
the status of the subject information proffered within the context of this
order. If prior to, or at the time of such a conference, the supplier with-
draws its designation of such information as being subject to this order, but
nonetheless submits such information for purposes of the investigation, such
supplier shall express the withdrawal, in writing, and serve such withdrawal
upon all parties and the Court. If the recipient and supplier are unable to
concur upon the status of the subject information submitted as confidential
business information within ten days from the date of notification of such
disagreement, any party to this order may raise the issue of the designation
of such a status by way of motion to the Court. On such motion, the party
asserting confidentiality shall have the burden of proving that the material
in question is within the scope of protection afforded by Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Order.
8. This Protective Order shall not prevent any party from applying to
the Court for relief therefrom, or frbm applying to the Court for further or
additional Protective Orders, or from agreeing between themselves to modi-
fication of this Protective Order, subject to the approval of the Court.
9. All transcripts, depositions, exhibits, answers to interrogatories and
other documents filed with the Court pursuant to the pretrial discovery of
either party to this action which previously have been promptly designated
in writing by either party as comprising or containing Confidential Informa-
tion and all pleadings or memoranda purporting to reproduce or paraphrase
such Confidential Information shall be filed in sealed envelopes or other
appropriate sealed containers on which shall be endorsed the title of this
action, an indication of the nature of the contents of such sealed envelope or
other container, the word "CONFIDENTIAL" and a statement substan-
tially in the following form:
-This envelope containing documents which are filed in this case by
(name or party) is not to be opened nor the contents thereof to be dis-
played or revealed except by order of the Court.-
10. Confidential information, when in tangible form, must be main-
tained by the party to whom it is produced or supplied at the business office
of the outside counsel of record ip this action for such party and may not be
transferred, moved or taken to any other location at any time, except with
permission of the supplying party or the Court. No copies of confidential
information shall be made except for purposes of this litigation and as au-
thorized in writing by counsel for the supplier party or by order of the
Court. A record of authorizations shall be maintained, together with a log
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showing pertinent details of the copying.
The party producing any document or thing marked CONFIDEN-
TIAL pursuant to paragraph 2 hereof shall retain the original thereof but
any other party, by its counsel, shall have the right to examine the original,
to be provided with a full and complete copy and to call for production of
the original at the trial of this action.
11. If counsel for any party believes that questions put to a witness
being examined in pre-trial deposition will disclose trade secrets or confi-
dential business information of his client, or that the answers to any ques-
tion or questions require such disclosure, or if documents to be used as ex-
hibits during the examination contain such confidential information, such
counsel shall so notify opposing counsel and the deposition of such witness,
or confidential portions thereof, shall be taken in the presence of only per-
sons subject to this order.
12. Transcripts of such depositions shall be treated as confidential
materials in accordance with this Protective Order, except that within
thirty days after counsel for the party requesting such treatment of any
depositions or exhibits therein marked has received a copy of the transcript
of such deposition, he shall designate to opposing counsel those portions of
the transcript regarded as confidential and those portions only will be han-
dled thereafter in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order.
13. Each court reporter who takes testimony shall sign an undertaking
in the form attached. Each person subject to this order shall take all appro-
priate steps to ensure that all legal assistants and clerical assistants subject
to this order are apprised of the terms of this order and the requirements
herein as to confidentiality.
14. The Agency acknowledges that any document or information sub-
mitted as confidential business information pursuant to paragraph 2 above
is to be treated as such within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) and 18
U.S.C. 1905, subject to a challenge by any party pursuant to the terms of
this order or to a final ruling, afternotice, by the Agency or its Freedom of
Information Act Officer to the contrary, or by appeal of such a ruling, in-
terlocutory or otherwise.
15. The Agency shall take all necessary and proper steps to preserve
the confidentiality of, and to protect each supplier's rights with respect to,
any confidential business information designated by the supplier in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 above, including, without limitation, (a) notifying
the supplier promptly of: (i) any inquiry or request by anyone for the sub-
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stance of or access of such confidential business information, other than
those authorized pursuant to this order, under the Freedom of Information
Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 552), and (ii) any proposal to declassify or
make public any such confidential business information; and (b) providing
the supplier at least seven days after receipt of such inquiry or request
within which to take action before the Agency or its Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Officer, or otherwise to preserve the confidentiality of and to pro-
tect its rights in, and to, such confidential business information.
16. No less than ten days prior to the initial disclosure of any confiden-
tial information submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 to a proposed
expert, the party proposing to use such expert shall submit in writing the
name of such proposed expert and his or her educational and employment
history to the supplier. If the supplier objects to the disclosure of such confi-
dential business information to such proposed expert as inconsistent with
the language or intent of this order or on other grounds, it shall notify the
recipient in writing of its objection and the grounds therefor, and if the
dispute is not resolved on an informal basis, the supplier within ten days of
receipt of such notice of objections shall submit each objection to the Court
for a ruling. Submission of confidential business information to such pro-
posed expert shall be withheld pending the ruling of the Court. [The terms
of this paragraph shall be inapplicable to experts within the Agency or to
experts from other governmental agencies who are consulted with or used
by the Agency.]
17. If confidential business information submitted in accordance with
paragraph 2 is disclosed to any person other than in the manner authorized
by this protective order, the party responsible for the disclosure must imme-
diately bring all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure to the attention
of the supplier and the Court and, without prejudice to other rights and
remedies of the supplier, make every effort to prevent further disclosure by
it or by the person who was the recipient of such information.
18. Within 30 (thirty) days of the final conclusion of this litigation,
each party that is subject to this order shall assemble and return to the
supplier all items containing confidential business information submitted in
accordance with paragraph 2 above, including all copies of such matter
which may have been made, but not including copies containing notes or
other attorney's work product that may have been placed thereon by coun-
sel for the receiving party. All copies containing notes or other attorney's
work product shall be destroyed. Receipt of material returned to the sup-
plier shall be acknowledged in writing.
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NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have
read the Protective Order attached and will not divulge any information
covered by this Protective Order to any person for any purpose, other than
that directly associated with my official duties in connection with the in-
stant litigation. Neither will I directly or indirectly use, or allow the use of
such information for any purpose other than that directly associated with
my official duties in connection with the instant litigation.
Further, I will not by direct action, discussion, recommendation, or
suggestion to any person reveal the nature or content of any information
covered by this Protective Order.
Signed
Dated
Firm or affiliation
